federal arbitration has strayed well beyond the FAA's purpose and scope. 9 Given the current composition of the Court, only legislation can realign domestic arbitration practice with its historical purpose. However, as discussed below, legislation has largely stalled and limited regulatory actions to protect consumers face strong political headwinds. 10 A concurrent approach is to continue pushing for evolution of the arbitral forum to accommodate the increasing number of forced participants with claims that implicate matters of public policy, including federal statutory claims. Perhaps the best example of such evolution is in the context of securities arbitration in the forum administered by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). 11 Pushed by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and investor advocates, FINRA has made significant changes to its arbitration rules governing customer disputes to better serve investors. Although concerns remain about investor access, the lack of transparency, and investors' perception of fairness, among other things, FINRA arbitration compares favorably to arbitration of consumer claims. 12 Similarly, incorporating due process and procedural reforms to increase access, fairness, and transparency in other arbitration forums provides increased protections for individuals forced into a process that many feel is rigged against them. 13 It may also provide a less-expensive alternative to litigation of smaller claims in some contexts, such as small-investor claims against their brokers.
14 To the extent such reforms incorporate procedures common in judicial litigation, and added costs, businesses may re-think their use of mandatory PDAAs in the first place. (the Court's arbitration jurisprudence "has created a robust, preemptive federal proarbitration policy . . . largely untethered to the language of the FAA"). 10 See infra notes 43-66 and accompanying discussion. 11 FINRA is a private, not-for-profit corporation functioning as a self-regulatory organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. FINRA was formed in July 2007 by the consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). FINRA is responsible for regulatory oversight of broker-dealers in the U. 12 See infra notes 66-99 and accompanying discussion. 13 PDAAs allow businesses to manage litigation costs and risks by providing certainty of the forum and the rules applicable to the resolution of their disputes, privacy, a faster and less costly process, and finality of the decision, which is often made by an arbitration panel composed of industry experts. 16 In response to initial judicial hostility to arbitration, Congress passed the FAA in 1925, which declared PDAAs valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. 17 The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the FAA was to place arbitration agreements on "the same footing as other contracts."
18 Notwithstanding this principle re-iterated by the Court in a long line of cases through AT&T A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. arbitration applicable in both federal and state courts, which preempts conflicting state law.
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Businesses' use of PDAAs greatly expanded as the Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence elevated the FAA. The Supreme Court upheld mandatory arbitration of investor disputes with their brokers, 23 consumer contracts, 24 employment agreements, 25 and nursing home admission applications, 26 among others, providing the groundwork for enforcement of virtually every type of arbitration agreement in any context. 27 In contrast to PDAAs used in private, commercial contracts between businesses, PDAAs in consumer contracts or in other non-traditional contexts are not negotiated, and individuals subject to them rarely know that they exist or deprive them of their right to pursue judicial remedies.
28
Businesses have further sought to limit litigation costs of class actions by including class-action waivers in their contracts. 29 These provisions generally prohibit individuals from bringing a judicial class-action or other collective action (such as in the arbitral forum itself) or both. 30 As part of a mandatory PDAA, a class-action waiver requires an aggrieved party to bring his or her claim-regardless of its size-individually in arbitration. 31 Any hopes that the "effective vindication" doctrine 33 would serve to protect access to courts based on the size of the individual claim were dashed in Italian Colors where Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, dismissed the doctrine as mere dicta and rejected the notion that the costs of pursuing individualized claims in arbitration could invalidate a PDAA. 34 Reasoning that the doctrine originated from a desire to protect the prospective assertion of rights, 35 the Court made clear that the doctrine does not invalidate a mandatory PDAA due to costs associated with proving the claim.
36 " [T] he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy."
37 Concepcion and Italian Colors are widely regarded as having dealt a fatal blow to judicial class actions brought on behalf of consumers, civil rights plaintiffs, and others. 38 32 Id. at 338-39. 33 The "effective vindication" doctrine was derived from language in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., where the Supreme Court, in compelling arbitration of antitrust and unfair competition claims, stated that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute [providing the cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function." 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) . 34 American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 Ct. , 2311 Ct. (2013 . 35 According to the majority, examples of such barriers to the potential assertion of statutory rights include an arbitration provision forbidding the assertion of certain rights of action in the first place, or an arbitral system that imposes "administrative fees" that are "so high as to make access to the forum impracticable." Id. at 2310-11. 36 Id. at 2311. 37 Id. (2012) (Concepcion all but forecloses aggregate litigation for consumers, civil rights plaintiffs, and others because companies can essentially insulate themselves with waiver provisions that will be upheld); Gross, supra note 14, at 49 ("By inserting a class action waiver clause in their consumer contracts, companies can prevent consumers from aggregating small claims, forcing them to pursue small claims individually.") (citations omitted); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) ("It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name meaning 'conception' should come to signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs.") (emphasis added).
B. Legislative Re-Alignment of Domestic Arbitration Stalled
Consumer and investor protection advocates have pushed for legislation to address the due process and public policy concerns raised by the widening scope of mandatory arbitration into these non-traditional areas. In 2017 alone, Democratic members of Congress have introduced (or re-introduced) no less than ten bills in the new Congress to limit or ban the use of PDAAs or classaction waivers, or otherwise provide greater transparency and consumer protections in various contexts. 39 The most expansive, the Arbitration Fairness Act, would amend the FAA to ban mandatory arbitration of consumer (defined to include investor), employment, antitrust, and civil rights disputes. 40 A version of the Arbitration Fairness Act has been introduced in every Congress since 2007. 41 Other proposed legislation is more narrowly tailored to prohibit the use of PDAAs or class-action waivers in specific contexts. Four bills have been introduced that do not amend the FAA, but rather, amend other federal statutes to address mandatory arbitration in agreements between investors and their brokers or investment advisers, 42 consumer bank and credit card agreements, 43 student enrollment agreements at colleges and universities, 44 and employment agreements. 45 Still other bills seek to address the lack of transparency in private arbitration and the implications of that process on matters of public policy. The Arbi- 46 Other legislative proposals would amend the FAA to prohibit the enforcement of mandatory PDAAs in disputes that implicate matters of public health or safety, 47 or in the context of an employment or consumer agreement that would prohibit whistleblower or other reporting of unlawful conduct. 48 Finally, the Restoring Statutory Rights Act of 2017 would amend the FAA to restore its application to purely private, contractual disputes, by prohibiting PDAAs in cases involving the interpretation of a federal or state statute, or the U.S. Constitution, or a state's constitution. 49 Given Congress's current composition, it is highly unlikely that any of the proposed legislation amending the FAA will pass. While legislation amending other federal statutes to provide carve outs for specific types of disputes could fare better because they focus on specific areas, they also face difficult odds.
C. Regulatory (In)Action and Policy Shifts
Regulatory review of the use and impact of PDAAs and class-action waivers arguably provides a path to meaningful reform. Although limited in scope to the particular arena, agency rules are issued after months (or years) of study, a public notice-and-comment process, and other procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 50 As such, a rule promulgated under the APAincluding a rule limiting mandatory arbitration in a particular context-is usually substantiated with compelling public policy arguments and data in support of the rule, thereby providing a presumption of validity. 51 Yet recent events have shown that regulatory reform is also at the mercy of political forces, as the Trump administration has swiftly moved to halt, revise, or overturn regulations in every arena, including those curbing mandatory arbitration.
Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank"), 52 Congress expressly authorized the newly-created Consumer Fraud Protection Bureau ("CFPB") to conduct a study on the use of mandatory arbitration provisions in banking, credit card and other lending agreements, and to prohibit or limit the use of mandatory arbitration provi- sions. 53 After years of study and public field hearings, 54 on May 5, 2016 the CFPB released for public comment a proposed rule that would bar banks, lenders, and other providers of certain financial products from using mandatory arbitration provisions that include class-action waivers. 55 The CFPB received over 110,000 comment letters on its proposal and, on July 19, 2017, published a final rule that bans the use of class-action waivers in consumer contracts with providers of banking, credit, and lending. 56 The proposed rule also increases transparency by requiring companies that use arbitration to provide the CFPB with the pleadings and awards rendered in those proceedings. 57 The new rule will not likely go into effect, however, because Congress exercised its authority to reverse the rule under the Congressional Review Act, 58 and President Trump is expected to sign the legislation. 58 The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § § 801-808 (1996) , gives Congress the authority to pass a joint resolution to reverse an agency rule within sixty legislative days of its publication in the federal register. If both houses pass joint resolutions of disapproval and the President signs the resolution, the regulation is nullified, and provisions that had already been effective are retroactively negated. Moreover, a new rule in "substantially the same form" as the rejected rule may not be issued unless specifically authorized by Congress. 59 60 Several nursing homes and the American Health Care Association challenged the new regulation prior to its taking effect in November 2016, seeking an injunction to prevent enforcement of the rule on the grounds that the CMS exceeded its authority and that the regulation violated the FAA. 61 The district court granted an injunction and, on January 5, 2017, the CMS appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 62 However, the CMS withdrew its appeal before its brief was due in June 2017, and has since issued a proposed rule to remove the prohibition on PDAAs, which instead require enhanced notice provisions for residents and their families. 63 Similarly, the Department of Education ("DOE") published final regulations in November 2016 that, among other things, prohibited the use of PDAAs and class-action waivers in college student loan agreements. 64 In May 2017, the California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools filed a complaint challenging the regulations and seeking injunctive relief. 65 Two weeks before the new DOE regulations were to take effect, the DOE published a new rule postponing the implementation of "certain provisions" of the final regulationsincluding the provisions prohibiting PDAAs and class-action waivers-"until the judicial challenges to the final regulations [were] resolved." 66 Even if the DOE argues in favor of some parts of the 2016 final rules, however, it will likely reverse course on (or not defend) the prohibition against PDAAs and class- Another example of a regulatory shift will likely come from the Department of Labor ("DOL"), which in April 2016 passed a game-changing series of rules and exemptions to eliminate costly conflicts of interest in rendering retirement investment advice. 68 The new fiduciary rule (requiring that professionals provide retirement financial advice in the best interests of their clients) became applicable on June 9, 2017. The application of the remaining regulations, which allows for mandatory arbitration, but bans class-action waivers, was delayed until January 1, 2018. 69 The new DOL director appointed by President Trump has announced that it is considering changing or eliminating some or all 67 The notice postponing the implementation of the 2016 final rules laid the groundwork for reversal, as the DOE expressed concerns about the costs of implementing the rule in colleges, and also noting that the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation "raised serious questions concerning the validity of certain provisions of the final regulations. . . ." Id. The DOE announced that it would continue its review and revisions to the 2016 regulations. Id. at 27622. 68 70 It is unlikely that the DOL's ban on the use of class-action waivers in agreements to provide retirement financial advice will survive. Indeed, in defending the fiduciary rule and exemptions in pending litigation challenging the rules, the DOL stated that the department is changing its stance on the class-action waiver provision and would no longer defend it. 71 Another abrupt reversal is in the context of three consolidated cases currently pending before the Supreme Court, 72 challenging the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") position that class-action waivers in employment agreements violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act by precluding employees from engaging in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 73 The Court will resolve the conflict between the Seventh and Ninth Circuit, which have held that class-action waivers violate Section 7 of the NLRA, 74 and the Fifth Circuit's position that they do not. 75 On June 16, 2017, the government took the nearly unprecedented These examples illustrate the potential for targeted reform of mandatory arbitration, supported by the experience of agency staff, studies, and a public notice-and-comment process. But, the recent rollbacks and actions by the Trump administration are a stark reminder of the limits of regulatory reform.
II. IMPROVING ACCESS AND FAIRNESS IN RESPONSE TO MANDATORY ARBITRATION: THE FINRA EXAMPLE
Given the current legal landscape, an alternative, pragmatic approach to dealing with the vast expansion of mandatory arbitration is to focus on the arbitral forum itself. The leading example of this arbitral evolution is in the context of securities arbitration before FINRA, the self-regulatory organization responsible for oversight over broker-dealers in the United States. 77 Because it is under direct regulatory oversight by the SEC, FINRA's processes and rules, including those governing securities arbitration, are subject to the SEC's investor-protection mandate.
78 This is a significant distinction from arbitral forums where consumer, employment, and other commercial matters are resolved. 79 Arbitration of disputes among securities industry participants has a long history, dating back to the founding of the predecessor self-regulatory organiza- 88 The SEC also helped develop a uniform code of arbitration procedure, which was voluntarily adopted by SROs. 89 The SEC has since pushed SROs to develop a litigation model of arbitration consistent with procedural due process and designed to improve investors' perception of fairness. 90 As early as 1989, the SEC approved amendments to SRO rules (now embodied in FINRA Rule 2268) 91 requiring that specific language and disclosures be included in customer agreements that contain a PDAA, 92 and further prohibiting SRO members from inserting "any condition" in a PDAA that limits or contradicts the arbitration rules of any SRO. 93 FINRA has effectively used Rule 2268(d) to prohibit member firms from inserting class-action waivers in customer agreements 94 and, most recently, to address the recent trend of firms using forum selection clauses to change the hearing location or require arbitration in another forum. 95 Between 1997 and 2007, the SEC approved nearly all of the rule proposals filed by the NASD as a result of a comprehensive review undertaken by the Arbitration Policy Task Force, which was appointed by the NASD's Board of Governors. 96 The resulting 1996 Ruder Report contained over seventy recom- mendations to "revamp securities industry arbitration," most of which have been implemented in some form. 97 The SEC has since approved new FINRA rules or amendments designed to improve investors' access to the forum, provide certain due process protections, level the playing field, and increase transparency. 98 FINRA has amended the definition of "public arbitrator" to eliminate individuals with ties to the securities industry from the public arbitration pool, 99 and provide customers with the option of an "all public" arbitration panel. 100 FINRA's rules assure that customers can proceed at a geographic hearing location that is convenient for them. 101 FINRA has also amended its procedural rules to significantly limit the grounds upon which motions to dismiss may be granted prior to a hearing, thereby assuring that most customer claims be reviewed on the merits. 102 It has also simplified the discovery process through a presumptive automatic exchange of 103 FINRA has also attempted to answer calls for more transparency by requiring arbitration panels to provide "explained decisions" upon the parties' request. 104 Additionally, FINRA has reduced cost and improved access for investors with smaller claims. FINRA has a simplified arbitration process that allows for the case to proceed entirely on the pleadings and other papers submitted by the parties, and provides a hearing option solely at the request of the customer. 105 to make reforms to increase access, lower costs, and provide some due process protections for those claims.
CONCLUSION
The widespread use of mandatory arbitration provisions and class-action waivers have required domestic arbitral forums to evolve and incorporate due process protections and procedures to increase access, level the playing field, and provide transparency. Unless and until the misalignment of Supreme Court jurisprudence and the FAA is corrected through legislative action, there is little choice but to provide better protections for forced participants of the process, even if those protections may fall short of alleviating concerns about access, process, and fairness.
Businesses that use PDAAs should also encourage reforms in other arbitral forums, even if they come at the expense of some of the benefits of arbitration in the first place. Fundamental notions of fairness and access to justice require greater transparency and some of the procedural protections found in judicial proceedings, particularly when the disputes implicate, at least in part, matters of public policy. Political winds change course; an evolution to better access, fairness, transparency, and due process for forced users of arbitration in nontraditional claims may be the best defense to preserve it.
